To determine if corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate political activity are economic substitutes or economic complements, I assemble and analyze the largest dataset possible from existing data sources incorporating both types of non-market behavior. Examining the joint distribution of an index of firms' CSR behavior and an indicator of whether or not firms lobby reveals that firms at both the positive and the negative extremes of social responsibility are more likely to have been politically active. Regressing the CSR index and a measure of lobbying intensity, individually, on Tobin's Q allows me to test whether CSR and corporate political activity separately enhance firms' value; regressing an interaction between the CSR index and the measure of lobbying intensity on Tobin's Q, allows me to test whether they play complementary roles in enhancing firms' value. Higher CSR ratings, more intensive lobbying, and the interaction between the CSR rating and lobbying intensity all appear to increase value when comparing firms; however, when each firm is studied over time, only the interaction between CSR rating and lobbying intensity appear to increase firm value. Taken together this suggests that firms' CSR positions work as an economic complement to its political activity rather than a substitute-jointly the two types of non-market behavior increase a firm's value, while independently each activity is more difficult to reconcile and perhaps may simply be symptomatic of some other inherently unobservable firm-fixed characteristic such as 'good management'. Illustrative cases round-out the large dataset analysis.
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Introduction
Are corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate political activity substitutes or complements? The simplistic, popular answer to this question is that they are substitutes, since it is easy to classify firms that engage in CSR as being 'good' and equally easy to classify firms that attempt to exert political influence as being 'evil'; the reality, however, is likely to be more complex. Despite the importance of untangling this relationship-which potentially has major implications for our understanding of both CSR and corporate political activity-scarce resources have been devoted to it to date. Nevertheless, Lyon and Maxwell (2008) have called for exactly this type of research, suggesting that "corporate political activities need to be incorporated into an overarching framework for CSR."
For consumers, we think of substitutes as being goods where an individual derives the same value from picking some fixed quantity of one good versus another good (e.g. wearing a red shirt or wearing a blue shirt gives an individual the same utility) and complements as goods where consumers derive the most value from consuming both goods simultaneously in appropriate proportions (e.g. left shoes and right shoes only give consumers utility when consumed in equal proportions). In the case of CSR and corporate political activity, we can think of these as distinct non-market actions firms may pursue to manage their external business environment; however, the relationship between the two types of non-market strategies is less clear than that between red shirts and blue shirts or that between left shoes and right shoes. Does CSR create more value for firms when done by itself or when coupled with an appropriate, complementary, corporate political stance? 2 We could imagine a manager whose only concern is increasing the value of his business seeing CSR and lobbying as substitutes and making a choice between one or the other: e.g. he could choose (i) to run a firm that derives its profits from choosing a cheaper production process that requires heavy pollution (social irresponsibility) and lobbying to protect his ability to pollute; or, he could choose (ii) to run a firm that derives its profits from selling the same good using a more expensive 'green' production technology and hoping to sell it to consumers who appreciate and are willing to pay a premium for his efforts to be 'good,' as in Bagnoli and Watts (2003) who argue that "firms compete for socially responsible consumers."
1 Alternatively, we could imagine a manager who is more strategic in his decision-making and sees CSR and lobbying as complements: e.g. he could pursue good CSR by developing a (more costly) 'green technology' and attempt to gain value from being at the top end of the CSR spectrum by lobbying to push the regulatory environment in a direction that benefits his ownership of a proprietary socially responsible technology at the expense of his competitors. 2 Which of these alternative structures for non-market activity creates the most valuable firm?
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether or not CSR and corporate political activity are substitutes or complements. It achieves this goal by merging well-known datasets on CSR and firms' political activity that to date have only been examined separately-and analyzing them jointly. First, it examines the peculiarities of the joint empirical distribution of firms' lobbying behavior and firms' CSR; then it tests how CSR and lobbying behavior, individually and jointly, impact firms' valuations. This research reveals that (i) firms at both 3 negative and positive extremes of a CSR index are more likely to have lobbied than firms that display more typical levels of socially responsible behavior, that (ii) both CSR and lobbying, individual and jointly, explain higher financial valuations when comparing firms; and that (iii) more intensive CSR and lobbying work as complements when examining individual firms over time since their interaction continues to explain higher valuations, however, more intensive CSR and lobbying efforts alone may lead to lower valuations within a single firm over time.
Literature Review
Past researchers have studied questions related to CSR and financial performance and corporate political activity and financial performance independently. They have not considered empirically the possibility that CSR and corporate political activity may be related and that 'good managers' may choose to engage in both types of non-market strategies. Consequently, prior literature has not considered the joint effects of corporate political influence and CSR on firms' financial valuations.
The only consensus that has emerged from the separate lines of research regressing measures of CSR and of corporate political influence on measures of firms' financial performance is that while possible to document the value of either CSR or lobbying between firms that it is harder to document either's value within firms, when controlling for persistent firm-fixed factors. One explanation for why the effects disappear within firms is that good CSR or engaging in political activity may simply be symptomatic of 'good management' which is an inherently difficult to measure and, plausibly, firm-fixed characteristic. Moreover, to date no study has looked at data on both CSR and corporate political activity simultaneously despite some suggestions to investigate the potential relationship between the two types of non-market behavior-both of which may be the result of 'good management'.
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CSR and Financial Performance
Before CSR was at the forefront of popular media attention, 3 the Nobel prize-winning economist Milton Freidman (1970) famously quipped that the only "social responsibility of business is to increase its profits"-suggesting that there should be no link between firms' CSR initiatives and their financial performance. Freidman (1970) went on to suggest that if there is any relationship, CSR initiatives should be a drag on firm performance as they can only be the result of managerial malfeasance. Griffin and Mahon (1997) and Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh (2009) provide extensive literature reviews on the academic debate Friedman's comment sparked, chronicling a large number of studies that come to divergent conclusions about CSR's effect on firms' financial performance-some finding a negative effect, others an inconclusive effect, and yet others a positive effect. I highlight only a few key studies and their similarities.
Leading business strategy scholars, such as Porter and Kramer (2002) , have suggested that firms can benefit from CSR efforts as existing views of the firm fail to take into account managing relationships with all stakeholders, which is precisely where CSR may provide firms a competitive advantage. This 'Organizational Theory View of CSR' tends to focus all stakeholders rather than just shareholders alone; between firm studies tend to be used to support the view. Waddock and Graves (1997a) run a test comparing different firms that indicates higher CSR scores predict better financial performance. In separate research, Waddock and Graves (1997b) suggest that one reason they may find the earlier positive relationship between CSR and financial performance may be that firms with 'higher quality management' perform better at CSR. Hillman and Keim (2001) 
Corporate Political Activity and Financial Performance
Moving to the literature on corporate political activity's effect on firms' aggregate financial performance, the debate follows a similar pattern: it typically finds a positive effect between firms, but a negative or inconclusive effect within firms or when otherwise controlling for managerial qualities. In a recent study, Chen, Parsley, and Yang (2010) show that portfolios composed of firms that lobby more intensely outperformed portfolios of those that lobby less intensely; they caution, however, that "simply spending the most on lobbying does not necessarily lead to better financial performance" as their test is one that compares different firms, 6 rather than examining single firms over time. Agrawal and Knoeber (1999) 
Assembling a Dataset on CSR and Corporate Political Activity
To achieve this paper's purpose, I assemble the most comprehensive dataset possible based on available CSR and lobbying data. This allows me to begin answering whether the two types of non-market strategies are substitutes or complements. My dataset is an unbalanced panel covering US firms for the years 1998 through 2005 and contains at most 3,350 firms in the cross-section. To construct it, I merged together data that appears in (i) the most complete database available on CSR, (ii) public records on firms' lobbying expenditures, and (iii) firms' accounting statements. (Milyo, Primo & Groseclose, 2000; Ansolabehere, Snyder, & Tripathi, 2002) From this dataset, I will use two primary variables based on lobbying disclosures for my analysis. The first of these is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if firms lobby and a value of 0 otherwise. Summary statistics included in Table 1 reveal that only about 28% of the firms in the sample actually engage in any sort of formal lobbying. 10 For this study, I have also created a measure of firms' lobbying intensity that is the percentage of a firm's total (accounting) assets spent on lobbying. The advantage of this variable is that it is defined in a manner that makes it independent of scale (i.e. is comparable across firms regardless of their size), which also makes it appropriate to include in Tobin's Q valuation regressions.
CSR Data from KLD
8 Firms have been legally required to report all lobbying expenditures in the US since the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. 9 Furthermore, existing research has documented that campaign contributions have little impact on the legislative process and may merely be a form of 'corporate consumption'. (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder , 2003) 10 28% of the firms in the sample lobbying is a high percentage when compared to the fraction of all active firms in the COMPUSTAT database which lobby (around 10%). The reason that more firms in the sample I use for this research lobby is that firm size is a good predictor of whether or not firms lobby-and the sample included here is limited to those firms which KLD rates on CSR dimensions, a sample that includes primarily the largest firms in the US.
Tobin's Q (Dependent Variable) and Controls from COMPUSTAT
I will use Tobin's Q as the dependent variable in a regression-based test of whether corporate political activity and CSR work as substitutes or complements, as Tobin's Q is the most-widely used measure in studies of both CSR's effect (on financial performance) and corporate political activity's effect (on financial performance). 11 I construct the Tobin's Q variable from COMPUSTAT, such that it equals the market value of the firm divided by the book value of the firm. When the variable takes on values greater than one, the market perceives the combination of tangible and intangible resources the firm has assembled as being worth more than the replacement value of the firm; hence, higher values of Tobin's Q indicate superior financial performance of the firm. Furthermore, a manager's goal should be to maximize his Tobin's Q value as this indicates that he is using the firm's resources in the best possible manner.
Studies using Tobin's Q as the dependent variable typically include a set of control variables related to other observable characteristics of the firm that are included on their financial statements. I take data on the most commonly incorporated control variables-log(total assets), leverage, capital intensity, R&D intensity 12 , and log(employees)-from COMPUSTAT.
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The Joint Distribution of CSR and Lobbying
As a first step in my empirical attempts to discern whether social responsibility and lobbying are substitutes or complements, I examine the joint empirical distributions of the attributes. This goes beyond the summary statistics of the independent distributions of firm's lobbying activity and CSR levels provided in Table 1 .
If corporate political activity and CSR were substitutes, then we would expect to find that only the most socially irresponsible firms are likely to lobby, since these firms have chosen to ignore CSR activity in favor of engaging with political actors. If corporate political activity and CSR were complements, then we would expect firms' lobbying behavior to vary in some other systematic way with their CSR behavior and perhaps firms having the best CSR records would be more likely to engage in corporate political activity. Of course, it is also possible that there is no relationship between corporate political activity and CSR, in which case the distribution of CSR activity should look identical for firms regardless of their lobbying (political activity) status. Figure 2 shows overlaid histograms of the density of KLD scores (i) for firms that lobby and (ii) for those firms that do not lobby. 14 The first moment, or mean, of both distributions appears the same, but the second moment, or variance, appears to differ. The graph shows that firms at both extremes of social responsibility are more likely to lobby than firms with more typical levels of CSR: the most socially irresponsible and the most socially responsible firms are the ones that lobby. While the finding that the most socially irresponsible firms lobby could by itself suggest a substitute-like relationship, the parallel finding that the most socially responsible firms also lobby is more suggestive of a complementary relationship. To test whether the two distributions shown in Figure 1 are different more formally, I
Firms that Lobby have a KLD Index Distribution with Fatter Tails
examine their discrete joint empirical distributions in Table 2 . A Chi-squared test indicates a very high likelihood that firms that lobby have a different KLD index distribution with fatter tails than firms that do not lobby, as the p-value is less than 0.000. Taken together it is clear that the CSR behavior of firms that lobby is different than that of firms that do not lobby. Given that the distribution for firms that do lobby is fatter at both positive and negative tails, we can preliminarily deduce that lobbying and social responsibility are complements, since their distributions vary together in a systematic way.
KLD Index vs. Lobbying Intensity
Another way to examine the joint empirical distribution of CSR and corporate political activity is to look at a scatterplot of KLD Index scores versus the measure of lobbying intensity.
This appears in Figure 2 . It shows that despite firms at the extremes of social responsibility being more likely to lobby (as shown in Figure 1 ), firms at the extremes of social responsibility are less likely to lobby as intensively as firms in the middle of the social responsibility distribution. were an indifference curve/isoquant graph, however, is that the utility/output of each firm is not held at constant levels across all observations as they should be in a formal test. We can include 15 See Appendix Figure A2 for the case of Substitutes and Figure A3 for the case of Complements.
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A Test Linking CSR and Lobbying to Financial Performance
As alluded to above, one simple way to test if any two economic variables are substitutes or complements involves calculating their marginal rate of substitution. This test works because whenever two economic variables are substitutes their marginal rate of substitution is constant and whenever they are complements their marginal rate of substitution is a function of the underlying variables.
Using this logic, we can test whether CSR and corporate political activity are substitutes or complements if we can estimate how they enter into a firm's valuation-since this is a firm's equivalent to a utility function which we would need to differentiate with respect to our variables of interest to calculate their marginal rate of substitution. We can do this since we have data on firms' valuations, as measured by Tobin's Q, and believe that their valuations are a function of CSR and corporate political activity among other factors. A firm's financial valuation as a function of non-market activity variables can be estimated by running regressions of the form:
where ‫ܴܵܥ‬ ௧ represents the KLD Index variable; ‫ݕܾܾܮ‬ ௧ represents the Lobbying Intensity variable; ܺ ௧ represents other control variables common in regressions on Tobin's Q; and, the constant/fixed-effects variable ߙ varies depending upon whether we want the test to be between or within firms. 16 We can then take the coefficient estimates from the above regression and use these to approximate the marginal rate of substitution between CSR and corporate political activity, which allows us to determine whether or not CSR and corporate political activity are substitutes or complements. If the marginal rate of substitution between CSR and political activity is a constant then the two inputs to a firm's valuation are substitutes. If the marginal rate of substitution between CSR and political activity is a function of those inputs to a firm's valuation then the two variables are complements.
From the regression above, we calculate a firm's marginal rate of substitution as:
Hence, if we estimate the coefficient on the interaction between CSR and corporate political activity (ߨ) to be zero, ‫ܴܵܯ‬ ௌோ,௬ will be a constant indicating that CSR and corporate political activity are substitute inputs for managers. Alternatively, if we estimate that the coefficient on the interaction between CSR and corporate political activity (ߨ) has a non-zero value, then ‫ܴܵܯ‬ ௌோ,௬ will be a function of CSR and corporate political activity, indicating that the two types of non-market strategies are complements.
Estimates Between Firms Show Value of Both CSR and Lobbyingand Suggest a Complementary Relationship
As a first test of whether CSR and lobbying are complements or substitutes using Tobin's Q regressions and the framework outlined above, I estimate between regressions that include period, but not firm fixed-effects. I estimate the regressions that compare different firms first to be consistent with the 'Organizational Theory View of CSR' and the lobbying literatures that finds a positive effect of CSR and lobbying independently on firms' financial valuations when comparing different firms. In the next sub-section, I will run regressions that look within individual firms over time and that may provide a more econometrically sound test, as they control for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity such as managerial quality which may be influencing decisions related to the levels of firms' CSR efforts and the intensity of their political activity.
Hence, as a first test, I estimate variations on the between regression:
We should expect to find a positive and significant coefficient (ߢ) on the level of CSR and a positive and significant coefficient (ߣ) on the level of lobbying if each independently increases the valuation of firms-which would be consistent with prior research that finds that CSR and lobbying increase firms' Tobin's Q values when comparing firms. As outlined in the regression framework section above, we should expect to find a positive and significant coefficient (ߨ) on the interaction between the level of CSR and lobbying if the two activities are complements between firms and we should expect to find a statistically insignificant coefficient (ߨ) on the interaction term if the two non-market activities are substitutes between firms. The results from my estimates appear in Table 3 .
The results in Table 3 show positive and significant values on the coefficients for CSR (ߢ), corporate political activity (ߣ), and for the interaction between the two types of non-market behavior (ߨ). The results for CSR (ߢ) and for corporate political activity (ߣ) are consistent with the 'Organizational Theory View of CSR' and with past researchers results showing a positive effect corporate political activity on firms' financial performance when comparing firms. The result for the interaction coefficient (ߨ), however, is what we are most interested in, since the purpose of running these regressions was to get at whether or not CSR and corporate political activity are substitutes or complements; its positive and significant value suggests once again that CSR and corporate political activity are complements. Despite the results, these between firm regressions are subject to the critique about unobserved firm-level heterogeneity that proponents of the within firm regressions offer. The critique suggests that I might find the above results because of unobservable managerial quality such that better managers choose higher CSR levels and higher political activity levels, whereas worse managers do not pursue the non-market strategies. Hence, if I included firm fixed-effects to control for persistent attributes of managerial quality that might be causing the levels of CSR and lobbying intensity that I am observing, my positive results could disappear, as higher managerial quality would also cause higher levels of Tobin's Q for other reasons.
Estimates Within Firms Reveal that the Complementary Relationship between CSR and Lobbying is Robust
If in within firm tests I still find a positive and significant interaction effect (ߨ) between CSR and lobbying and if managerial decisions are persistent, then my primary result that CSR and corporate political activity are complementary is robust.
Here I run such a test, estimating variations on the within regression:
The primary difference between the within firms estimates presented here and the between firms estimates presented in the prior table are that the within firms estimates control for time-persistent unobservable characteristics by including firm dummy-variables (ߙ ) in the estimation. Essentially adding the firm dummy-variables (ߙ ) to the estimation should control for unobservable managerial talent that may be causing firms to engage in CSR or corporate political activity. This is a test that looks at what happens inside individual firms over time rather than when comparing different firms as the regressions did in the last sub-section.
We should expect to find a negative and/or insignificant coefficient (ߢ) on the level of Table 4 . Table 4 show negative and/or insignificant values on the coefficients for CSR (ߢ) and for corporate political activity (ߣ)-suggesting that firms superior social performance and the intensity of firms' political activity may in fact be symptomatic of higher quality management, or some other persistent firm-fixed characteristic, and have no real direct effect on their financial performance. Nevertheless, the results in Column 4 of Table 4 find a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction between firms' CSR level and lobbying (ߨ)-which yet again suggests that CSR and corporate political activity are complements. Moreover, it suggests that even when controlling for unobservable managerial quality, CSR may indeed improve firms' financial performance, but only if it is coupled with the appropriate corporate political activityallowing the firm to overcome the extra costs that CSR efforts alone impose (as suggested by the negative coefficient ߢ).
If we took the results in Column 4 of Table 4 and held the left hand side (valuation level) variable constant, and used the point estimates for the coefficients on CSR (ߢ), corporate political activity (ߣ), and their interaction (ߨ) to draw a graph, with axes representing lobbying intensity and the KLD index, they would generate indifference curves that are convex with respect to the origin; this result would be consistent (i) with the shape of the scatter plot of the data in Figure 2 , (ii) with the marginal rate of substitution varying depending upon the level of CSR or the intensity of corporate political activity, and most importantly (iii) with the notion that CSR and corporate political activity are complementary inputs for firms that when used together can raise their valuations despite the negative independent effects of CSR and corporate political activity.
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The result that CSR alone may decrease firms' valuations is consistent with the oftquoted Milton Friedman (1970) statement that the only "social responsibility of business is to increase its profits." The result that CSR can become profitable when taking into account firms' lobbying behavior, however, may also be consistent with Friedman's (1970) argument, given that one of the conditions he put on making "as much money as possible" was "while conforming to the basic rules of society (those embodied in law)". To the extent that firms can lobby successfully to alter laws to yield higher profits by institutionally requiring others to match their "socially responsible" behavior or to lose out on business opportunities, Freidman would One reason we may find the result that CSR and corporate political activity are complements could be that the way firms profit is from the "use of social activity as a competitive weapon" potentially giving them a leg up in their lobbying efforts (Devinney 2009 ).
If so this may be a classic case of when "regulation is acquired by industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit", otherwise known as regulatory capture. (Stigler 1971) Traditionally, regulatory capture has been viewed as something that "can be very costly to society" given its distributional consequences (Dal Bó, 2006) ; however, if certain firms that are exceptional at some aspect of CSR are more able to capture regulators and more able to demand regulation that will be good for society, such as reducing aggregate pollution, the normative consequences are less clear.
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Robustness Checks
I address several possible concerns about robustness of the prior results in this subsection. The key points from Table 3 and Table 4 continue to hold after these robustness tests:
when comparing firms better CSR, more intensive lobbying, and the interaction between better CSR and more intensive lobbying explain higher Tobin's Q values; however, when examining individual firms over time only the interaction between better CSR and more intensive lobbying can explain higher financial valuations and, if anything, better CSR by itself may reduce firms' financial valuations. Taken together my results remain highly indicative of a complementary relationship between CSR and corporate political activity.
Checking for Sampling Issues
There are several potential sampling issues that could be driving my primary results. To overcome sampling-related concerns, I test to see if my results hold up when the sample is altered to correct for irregularities; they do when I re-run regressions on different sub-samples of the dataset designed to test their robustness. The sampling issues include: potential overrepresentation of socially responsible firms, outliers along the lobbying intensity dimension, and outliers at the extremes of CSR where there are only a few observations.
One well known issue related to the cross-section of firms on which KLD collects CSR data is that the sample likely over-represents firms that are CSR leaders, as a fraction of the firms included in the dataset, labeled as Domini 400 Social Index firms, were selected because they were believed a priori to be among the most socially responsible firms in the US. The rest of the firms were chosen to be in the sample based on having large market capitalizations. As such I create a subsample of the firms that excludes the Domini 400 Social Index firms that would not have been included in the pool of firms if it were not for their large market capitalizations.
When I re-run my regressions in Tables 3 and 4 above, on a sub-sample excluding Domini 400 firms that would not be in the sample otherwise, the results remain substantively the same.
Another sampling concern I tested was sensitivity to outliers. I re-ran the regressions in Table 3 and Table 4 , excluding the extreme outliers on both lobbying and CSR dimensions from the sample. When I exclude both lobbying and CSR extreme outliers, my primary result that lobbying and CSR are complements holds up; this remains true whether excluding just CSR outliers, just lobbying outliers, or both. 17 The one difference I find occurs when I exclude the most extreme outliers on the lobbying dimension: I find that in the firm fixed effects (or within)
regressions, that the negative lobbying intensity coefficient becomes statistically insignificant.
This suggests that a firm's lobbying intensity alone has no effect on a firm's Tobin's Q;
interactions between lobbying intensity and CSR levels nevertheless remain important because of their complementary relationship.
Disaggregating KLD Strengths/Weaknesses
As another test of the robustness of the results, instead of using the total KLD score as a measure of CSR, I disaggregate the measure into its positive (strengths) and negative (concerns) components. Otherwise, the regressions are run as within regressions as in Table 4 . The results appear in Table 5 . Table 5 shows that unlike in the Table 4 results, having negative CSR or being socially irresponsible (measured by KLD concerns rather than firms' placement on an aggregate index)
does not increases firms' valuations as suggested when the entire KLD Index is used. Rather, the results in Table 5 suggest that the optimal point for most firms to maximize their valuations, if lobbying intensity is held at its median value of zero, is for firms to set their CSR level near their median value of zero as well.
We also learn from In this section of the paper, I take the extra step to examine individual cases at the extremes of the CSR and lobbying distributions-hoping to see exactly how firms use their social responsibility position as a strategic complement to their lobbying behavior. At the negative extreme, Yum! Brands provides an example of how one firm complements its relative social irresponsibility with its lobbying efforts by seeking to maintain the policy/regulatory status quo. At the positive extreme, Hewlett-Packard provides an example of a firm that leverages its relatively positive social responsibility position in its lobbying efforts to advocate for policy stringency (Fremeth and Richter, 2011 ) that would allow them to monetize their existing activities and raise their rivals' costs.
Yum! Brands Complements Social Irresponsible Positions with Lobbying Efforts aimed at Maintaining the Status Quo
Yum! Brands, which owns Taco Bell and KFC among other fast-food brands, falls into the bottom 5% of firms on the social responsibility index most years in the sample. According to KLD, Yum! Brands has particular weaknesses in: paying executives and directors at unusually high rates; running into controversies related to affirmative action; finding themselves at the center of other diversity disputes; being relatively bad at controlling emissions of toxic chemicals; providing employees with poor benefits packages; running into other disputes with employees about minimum wage pay and failure to pay overtime; issues with practices in its supply chain; and, finally concerns over the safety/quality of its products.
Yum 
Hewlett-Packard Complements Socially Responsible Positions with Lobbying Efforts advocating for Policy Change towards Firms' Strengths
Hewlett-Packard, which is a multinational information technology services, software, and hardware company, falls consistently into the top 5% of firms on the social responsibility index.
According to KLD, Hewlett-Packard has particular strengths in: transparent reporting; charitable giving programs (within and outside of the US); having employee volunteer programs; having internal programs that support diversity and work/life balance; using clean energy among other environmentally proactive activities; and, bringing innovative products to market that are good for consumers. In summary, Hewlett-Packard appears to have complemented its social responsibility position with a lobbying strategy aimed at changing government policy in ways that allow it to benefit from the company's existing social responsibility positions, which were well in front of existing government regulation and policy at the time they were initiated. By positioning themselves ahead of government regulation on social issues, Hewlett-Packard appears to have been able to create sustainable value by lobbying for government regulation that raised their rivals' costs. One specific example comes from Hewlett-Packard's efforts on the Electronic Waste (eWaste) front. Hewlett-Packard was an innovator on eWaste issues and initially undertook ventures such as building its own facility to recycle eWaste at a great cost to themselves; however, they were later able to turn this into a competitive advantage by advocating for legislation that forced higher costs onto competitors who were not as far along on the issue. For more details on this case, see Fremeth and Richter (2011) .
Conclusion
In this research, I have shown that CSR and corporate political activity function as economic complements rather than as economic substitutes. Specifically, I have shown that while it is true that most socially irresponsible firms are more likely to have lobbied, that it is also the case the most socially responsible firms are also more likely to have lobbied. I have also 29
shown that in regressions that compare different firms (between tests), that lobbying intensity and CSR intensity both independently and jointly explain why some firms have higher valuations than others. More importantly, however, I have shown that in regressions that examine individual firms over time (within tests) that the interaction between lobbying intensity and CSR quality explains higher valuations, whereas CSR quality alone may lead to lower firm valuations.
The result that the interaction between CSR and corporate political activity remains positive and significant in both between and within firm tests, unambiguously supports the hypothesis that the two non-market strategies, CSR and corporate political activity, are complements.
My results bridge the findings between proponents of CSR-who build arguments based on organizational stakeholder theories and who run between firms tests to find empirical support that CSR increases firms' value-and the results of critics of CSR-who build their arguments based on economic theories of shareholder wealth maximization and who run within firm tests to find empirical support for the notion that CSR does not enhance firm value and may actually destroy it. The reality is that both the proponents of CSR and the critics of CSR have valid points; however, both have overlooked the complementary relationship between CSR and corporate political activity. When we add corporate political activity into the mix, we find that the proponents are correct that CSR increases the value of the firm in some circumstances, despite the critics also being correct that CSR by itself can decrease the value of the firm, since CSR only adds value when complemented with the appropriate level of corporate political activity.
Moreover, my results have serious implications for our understanding of any research on CSR or corporate political activity. If CSR and corporate political activity are complementary activities pursued by firms, as this research has shown, we should no longer consider the role of 30 CSR or political activity alone without considering the role of its complement, since doing so is likely to lead to biased results under most circumstances. Researchers attempting to answer valuation-related questions on either topic (CSR or corporate political activity) should ideally incorporate data on its complement into the analysis. Unfortunately, doing so is often not realistic given data availability constraints, in which case researchers should at least acknowledge how the complementary relationship between CSR and corporate political activity may bias results focused more narrowly on one of the two non-market strategies.
As a final thought, this research also suggests a greater need for researchers to study cases of regulatory capture that "while designed by industry primarily for its benefit" (Stigler 1971) may nevertheless promote positive social outcomes. Since CSR and corporate political activity are complements, these should be precisely the cases in which CSR is most profitable for firms. 
